Ideology can no longer provide a convincing effacement of sociopolitical contradictions because, according to Baudrillard, such “contradictions have taken [on] the [‘]pataphysical form of […] deficiency” (1990a:29). They have become a kind of disabling handicap, whose subaltern existence, as a political exception, can no longer be stigmatized or suppressed, but must in fact be recognized and legitimized, just as the social plight of the lunatic or the amputee must be acknowledged (through euphemisms) and accommodated (through prostheses). Such contradictions are tolerated so long as they are exposed and managed; however, the constant scrutiny of such critical analysis deprives the social system of any ideological credibility, and thus “the social looks in what it sees as its own […] waste for a sort of transpolitical legitimacy” (29-30).
Heidegger remarks that, while science may court a technological dangerousness, such a risk may nevertheless enable the transcendence of this dangerousness — for “[w]here the danger is […], there the saving power is already thriving” (1977:42). How can any solution to the problems of technology be anything but technological? How can any solution to the problems of philosophy be anything but philosophical? If ‘pataphysics is politically ineffective, perhaps it only seems so, because it proposes a radical, but illicit, hypothesis, arguing that a revolution must paradoxically partake of the very discursive strategies that it opposes in order to be a revolution. The ‘pataphysician does not counteract science so much as exaggerate science, adopting it parodically and applying it excessively, in order to destroy it by ultimately exhausting its imaginary potential.”